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  <title>DSpace Collection: Tài liệu mở về Pháp luật, thể chế xã hội, ...</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/8652" />
  <subtitle>Tài liệu mở về Pháp luật, thể chế xã hội, ...</subtitle>
  <id>https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/8652</id>
  <updated>2026-04-22T06:42:28Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-22T06:42:28Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Why International Criminal Law Can and Should be Conceived With Supra-Positive Law: The Non-Positivistic Nature of International Criminal Legality</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/9155" />
    <author>
      <name>Muñoz, Nuria Pastor</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://ikr.inceif.org/retrieve/0d76ca37-2373-43c4-ab66-c0b9fe641c20/Why International Criminal Law Can and Should be Conceived With Supra-Positive Law The Non-Positivistic Nature of International Criminal Legality-2022.pdf.jpg</id>
    <updated>2023-09-22T07:25:50Z</updated>
    <published>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <content>Book</content>
    <summary type="text">Title: Why International Criminal Law Can and Should be Conceived With Supra-Positive Law: The Non-Positivistic Nature of International Criminal Legality
Authors: Muñoz, Nuria Pastor
Abstract: International criminal law (ICL) is an achievement, but at the same time a challenge to the traditional conception of the principle of legality (lex praevia, scripta, and stricta – Sect. 1). International criminal tribunals have often based conviction for international crimes on unwritten norms the existence and scope of which they have failed to substantiate. In so doing, they have evaded the objection that they were applying ex post facto criminal laws. This approach, the relaxation of the concept of law by including norms whose existence is doubtful, has apparently served to maintain a concept of strict legality, but it is unsatisfying (Sect. 2).
Description: CC-BY</summary>
    <dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>When Should the Master Answer? Respondeat Superior and the Criminal Law</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/9344" />
    <author>
      <name>Silver, Kenneth</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://ikr.inceif.org/retrieve/cea3247d-81a6-449e-b480-7c5d7c27e1bd/When Should the Master Answer Respondeat Superior and the Criminal Law-2023.pdf.jpg</id>
    <updated>2023-09-28T07:16:04Z</updated>
    <published>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <content>Book</content>
    <summary type="text">Title: When Should the Master Answer? Respondeat Superior and the Criminal Law
Authors: Silver, Kenneth
Abstract: Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine conferring liability from one party onto another because the latter stands in some relationship of authority over the former. Though originally a doctrine of tort law, for the past century it has been used within the criminal law, especially to the end of securing criminal liability for corporations. Here, I argue that on at least one prominent conception of criminal responsibility, we are not justified in using this doctrine in this way. Firms are not answerable for the crimes committed by their employees, because firms cannot answer as to why the crime was committed; they lack the authority to offer the employee’s reasons for action. Though this rules out respondeat superior as a general principle, I show contexts in which vicarious liability is still appropriate in the criminal law, and I respond to a number of other concerns raised by this picture.
Description: CC-BY</summary>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>When is Disbelief Epistemic Injustice? Criminal Procedure, Recovered Memories, and Deformations of the Epistemic Subject</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/9100" />
    <author>
      <name>Bublitz, Jan Christoph</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://ikr.inceif.org/retrieve/8c8f5879-49bf-4ee4-b90c-6c03cf193b3d/When is Disbelief Epistemic Injustice Criminal Procedure, Recovered Memories, and Deformations of the Epistemic Subject-2023.pdf.jpg</id>
    <updated>2023-09-19T09:07:58Z</updated>
    <published>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <content>Book</content>
    <summary type="text">Title: When is Disbelief Epistemic Injustice? Criminal Procedure, Recovered Memories, and Deformations of the Epistemic Subject
Authors: Bublitz, Jan Christoph
Abstract: People can be treated unjustly with respect to the level of credibility others accord to their testimony. This is the core idea of the philosophical idea of epistemic justice. It should be of utmost interest to criminal law which extensively deals with normative issues of evidence and testimony. It may reconstruct some of the long-standing criticisms of criminal law regarding credibility assessments and the treatment of witnesses, especially in sexual assault cases. However, philosophical discussions often overlook the intricate complexities of real procedural law and its underlying considerations. In its present form, the philosophical notion of epistemic injustice provides limited insights into legal discourse; it necessitates translation and adaptation.
Description: CC-BY</summary>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>What is Hate Speech? The Case for a Corpus Approach</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/9258" />
    <author>
      <name>Lepoutre, Maxime</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Vilar-Lluch, Sara</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Borg, Emma</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://ikr.inceif.org/retrieve/a20b68a8-ece4-4290-ac25-a5727a0d028c/What is Hate Speech The Case for a Corpus Approach-2023.pdf.jpg</id>
    <updated>2023-09-26T09:08:51Z</updated>
    <published>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <content>Book</content>
    <summary type="text">Title: What is Hate Speech? The Case for a Corpus Approach
Authors: Lepoutre, Maxime; Vilar-Lluch, Sara; Borg, Emma
Abstract: Contemporary public discourse is saturated with speech that vilifies and incites hatred or violence against vulnerable groups. The term “hate speech” has emerged in legal circles and in ordinary language to refer to these communicative acts. But legal theorists and philosophers disagree over how to define this term. This paper makes the case for, and subsequently develops, the first corpus-based analysis of the ordinary meaning of “hate speech.” We begin by demonstrating that key interpretive and moral disputes surrounding hate speech laws—in particular, surrounding their compatibility with the rule of law, democracy, and free speech—depend crucially on the ordinary meaning of “hate speech.” Next, we argue, drawing on recent developments in legal philosophy, that corpus linguistics constitutes a distinctively promising tool for ascertaining the ordinary meaning of “hate speech.” Finally, we offer a proof of concept, by outlining, and analyzing the interpretive and moral implications of, the first such study.
Description: CC-BY</summary>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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