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    <title>Thư viện số Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu mở về Pháp luật, thể chế xã hội, ...</title>
    <link>https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/8652</link>
    <description>Tài liệu mở về Pháp luật, thể chế xã hội, ...</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2026 21:04:18 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-04-21T21:04:18Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Why International Criminal Law Can and Should be Conceived With Supra-Positive Law: The Non-Positivistic Nature of International Criminal Legality</title>
      <link>https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/9155</link>
      <description>Nhan đề : Why International Criminal Law Can and Should be Conceived With Supra-Positive Law: The Non-Positivistic Nature of International Criminal Legality
Tác giả : Muñoz, Nuria Pastor
Tóm tắt : International criminal law (ICL) is an achievement, but at the same time a challenge to the traditional conception of the principle of legality (lex praevia, scripta, and stricta – Sect. 1). International criminal tribunals have often based conviction for international crimes on unwritten norms the existence and scope of which they have failed to substantiate. In so doing, they have evaded the objection that they were applying ex post facto criminal laws. This approach, the relaxation of the concept of law by including norms whose existence is doubtful, has apparently served to maintain a concept of strict legality, but it is unsatisfying (Sect. 2).
Mô tả: CC-BY</description>
      <content:encoded>Book</content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 01 Jan 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>When Should the Master Answer? Respondeat Superior and the Criminal Law</title>
      <link>https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/9344</link>
      <description>Nhan đề : When Should the Master Answer? Respondeat Superior and the Criminal Law
Tác giả : Silver, Kenneth
Tóm tắt : Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine conferring liability from one party onto another because the latter stands in some relationship of authority over the former. Though originally a doctrine of tort law, for the past century it has been used within the criminal law, especially to the end of securing criminal liability for corporations. Here, I argue that on at least one prominent conception of criminal responsibility, we are not justified in using this doctrine in this way. Firms are not answerable for the crimes committed by their employees, because firms cannot answer as to why the crime was committed; they lack the authority to offer the employee’s reasons for action. Though this rules out respondeat superior as a general principle, I show contexts in which vicarious liability is still appropriate in the criminal law, and I respond to a number of other concerns raised by this picture.
Mô tả: CC-BY</description>
      <content:encoded>Book</content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>When is Disbelief Epistemic Injustice? Criminal Procedure, Recovered Memories, and Deformations of the Epistemic Subject</title>
      <link>https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/9100</link>
      <description>Nhan đề : When is Disbelief Epistemic Injustice? Criminal Procedure, Recovered Memories, and Deformations of the Epistemic Subject
Tác giả : Bublitz, Jan Christoph
Tóm tắt : People can be treated unjustly with respect to the level of credibility others accord to their testimony. This is the core idea of the philosophical idea of epistemic justice. It should be of utmost interest to criminal law which extensively deals with normative issues of evidence and testimony. It may reconstruct some of the long-standing criticisms of criminal law regarding credibility assessments and the treatment of witnesses, especially in sexual assault cases. However, philosophical discussions often overlook the intricate complexities of real procedural law and its underlying considerations. In its present form, the philosophical notion of epistemic injustice provides limited insights into legal discourse; it necessitates translation and adaptation.
Mô tả: CC-BY</description>
      <content:encoded>Book</content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://ikr.inceif.org/retrieve/8c8f5879-49bf-4ee4-b90c-6c03cf193b3d/When is Disbelief Epistemic Injustice Criminal Procedure, Recovered Memories, and Deformations of the Epistemic Subject-2023.pdf.jpg</guid>
      <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>What is Hate Speech? The Case for a Corpus Approach</title>
      <link>https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/9258</link>
      <description>Nhan đề : What is Hate Speech? The Case for a Corpus Approach
Tác giả : Lepoutre, Maxime; Vilar-Lluch, Sara; Borg, Emma
Tóm tắt : Contemporary public discourse is saturated with speech that vilifies and incites hatred or violence against vulnerable groups. The term “hate speech” has emerged in legal circles and in ordinary language to refer to these communicative acts. But legal theorists and philosophers disagree over how to define this term. This paper makes the case for, and subsequently develops, the first corpus-based analysis of the ordinary meaning of “hate speech.” We begin by demonstrating that key interpretive and moral disputes surrounding hate speech laws—in particular, surrounding their compatibility with the rule of law, democracy, and free speech—depend crucially on the ordinary meaning of “hate speech.” Next, we argue, drawing on recent developments in legal philosophy, that corpus linguistics constitutes a distinctively promising tool for ascertaining the ordinary meaning of “hate speech.” Finally, we offer a proof of concept, by outlining, and analyzing the interpretive and moral implications of, the first such study.
Mô tả: CC-BY</description>
      <content:encoded>Book</content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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