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| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Michele, Lombardi | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Foivos, Savva | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Nikolas, Zivanas | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-04-11T06:56:02Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-04-11T06:56:02Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-022-01425-3 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/7767 | - |
| dc.description | CC BY | vi |
| dc.description.abstract | Following the seminal contribution of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018), we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are fundamental behavioral units, and the outcomes of their interactions are predicted by applying the solution concept of the strong core. The planner’s exercise includes designing a code of rights that specifies the collection of coalitions having the right to block one outcome by moving to another. We provide a complete characterization of the implementable social choice rules. | vi |
| dc.language.iso | en | vi |
| dc.publisher | Springer | vi |
| dc.subject | Implementation | vi |
| dc.title | Implementation in strong core by codes of rights | vi |
| dc.type | Book | vi |
| Appears in Collections | OER - Kinh tế và Quản lý | |
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