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| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Deborah B., Gahururu | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Michael, Hintermüller | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Thomas M., Surowiec | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-04-03T08:03:27Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-04-03T08:03:27Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2022 | - |
| dc.identifier.govdoc | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10107-022-01800-z | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/7445 | - |
| dc.description | CC BY | vi |
| dc.description.abstract | A class of risk-neutral generalized Nash equilibrium problems is introduced in which the feasible strategy set of each player is subject to a common linear elliptic partial differential equation with random inputs. In addition, each player’s actions are taken from a bounded, closed, and convex set on the individual strategies and a bound constraint on the common state variable. Existence of Nash equilibria and first-order optimality conditions are derived by exploiting higher integrability and regularity of the random field state variables and a specially tailored constraint qualification for GNEPs with the assumed structure. | vi |
| dc.language.iso | en | vi |
| dc.publisher | Springer | vi |
| dc.subject | Nash equilibrium problems | vi |
| dc.subject | random inputs | vi |
| dc.title | Risk-neutral PDE-constrained generalized Nash equilibrium problems | vi |
| dc.type | Book | vi |
| Appears in Collections | ||
| OER - Khoa học Tự nhiên | ||
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