Item Infomation
Title: |
Too Objective for Culpability? |
Authors: |
Sarch, Alex |
Issue Date: |
2023 |
Publisher: |
Springer |
Abstract: |
To help explain in a principled way why criminal law doctrine tends to abstract away from motives and other individualized circumstances, I have defended an insufficient regard theory of criminal culpability that is more objective in certain respects than other views in the same camp. This has led Alec Walen to object that my view is too objective to be an account of culpability and is better understood as a theory of criminal wrongs. This challenge is important not least because it requires getting clearer about what wrongness and culpability are and what roles they play on a legal moralist picture of the criminal law. Here, I argue that Walen’s objection is mistaken. Once we get clearer on what distinguishes wrongness and culpability, it becomes clear that my account is best seen as a theory of culpability. |
Description: |
CC-BY |
URI: |
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11572-023-09665-9 https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/9319 |
Appears in Collections |
OER - Pháp luật - Thể chế xã hội |
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